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Abstract: Economic analysis of nuisance law can be divided into two branches: the 
transaction cost model and the externality model.  The two models provide a relatively 
complete positive theory of nuisance law.  Under the externality model, nuisance law 
optimally regulates activity levels.  Nuisance law induces actors to choose socially 
optimal activity levels by imposing liability when externalized costs are far in excess of 
externalized benefits or not reciprocal to other background external costs.  Proximate 
cause doctrine plays an important role in inducing optimal activity levels.  
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I. Introduction 
 
Nuisance law has been described as an impenetrable jungle.1  Judging by the dearth of 
efforts to codify it in the form of blackletter rules, this appears to have been an opinion 
shared by most legal scholars.2  The lack of clearly stated rules has probably delayed 
attempts to use economics to explain nuisance doctrine. 
 
In spite of this, some efforts have been made to provide an economic theory of nuisance 
law.  Most of those efforts, stemming from Coase,3 have relied on the theory of 
transaction costs to explain the functional distinction between nuisance and trespass law.4  
But the core of nuisance doctrine involves balancing tests and limitations on scope that 
are not easily understood on the basis of transaction cost theory.  This paper aims to 
explain the core doctrines of nuisance law.  Instead of transaction cost analysis, I will rely 
on an approach that I will refer to as the externality model. 
 
In contrast to the traditional legal commentary, I find nuisance law a coherent body of 
rules that serves an explainable function.  Nuisance law optimally regulates activity 
levels.  Nuisance law induces actors to choose socially optimal activity levels by 
imposing liability when externalized costs are far in excess of externalized benefits or far 
in excess of background external costs.  Proximate cause doctrine plays an important 
role, in this analysis, in generating optimal activity levels. 
 
II. Economics of Nuisances 
 
                                                 
1 WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 571 (1971). 
2 One effort to “codify” nuisance doctrine is Section 826 of the Second Restatement of Torts, which says: 
“An intentional invasion of another’s interest in the use and enjoyment of land is unreasonable if:(a) the 
gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the actor’s conduct, or (b) the harm caused by the conduct is 
serious and the financial burden of compensating for this and similar harm to others would not make the 
continuation of the conduct not feasible.” Restatement (Second) of Torts: Unreasonableness of Intentional 
Invasion § 826 (1977).  This effort is of questionable value because it refers to the actor’s conduct rather 
than his activity.  The reference to conduct could easily lead readers to believe that Section 826 is 
equivalent to the balancing test observed in negligence law – i.e., the Hand Formula.  Moreover, Section 
826 implies that strict liability should be applied to any activity that has a nontrivial interference with the 
plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of property.  The difficult question in nuisance law is determining how to 
balance externalized risks and externalized benefits. 
3 The economic theory of nuisance doctrine can be traced to its brief treatment by Coase.  Ronald H. Coase, 
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
4  The first detailed examination of the economics of nuisance law is that of Merrill, see Thomas W. 
Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining. Property Rights, 14 J. LEG. STUD. 13 (1985).  
Building on Coase, Merrill provides a transaction-cost theory of nuisance law.  The transaction cost 
analysis is also rooted at least in part in the property-versus-liability rule analysis of Calabresi and 
Melamed, see Guido Calabresi & A Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: 
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV L. REV 1089 (1972).  More recently, the transaction cost theory has 
been extended by Henry Smith, see Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 
90 VA. L. REV. 965 (2004).  The transaction-cost approach is essential for understanding the reasons 
trespass law cannot serve as a functional substitute to nuisance law.  However, the doctrines of nuisance 
law reflect considerations that go beyond the transaction cost theory. 
 2
The literature on the economics of nuisance law can be divided into two branches.  One is 
the transaction cost framework, which began with Coase’s discussion of nuisance in his 
famous article on transaction costs and resource allocation.5  The transaction cost 
approach emphasizes the functional differences between nuisance and trespass law, and 
provides a positive theory of the boundary between nuisance and trespass.6  It has also 
been applied to explain the law on priority (“coming to the nuisance”).7 
 
The other branch of work on the economics of nuisance law can be labeled the externality 
model, which focuses on the regulatory function of nuisance law.8  The externality 
approach offers a sparse model of the function of nuisance liability, and a positive theory 
of the core doctrines of nuisance.  The core doctrines examined under the externality 
model are those of intent, reasonableness, and proximate cause. 
 
While the transaction cost model explains why nuisance law may be socially preferable 
to trespass law under certain conditions, the externality model attempts to explain the 
specific features of nuisance law.  Alternatively, one could say that the transaction cost 
model addresses the boundary of nuisance law; explaining matters such as the choice 
between trespass and nuisance, the exclusion of liability for aesthetic disturbances, and 
rules on priority.  The externality model addresses the law’s function within the 
boundary.  
 
Because I will examine the core nuisance rules here, I will focus on the externality 
model.  The transaction cost models will be discussed as comparison points and largely in 
the margins.  The distinction between activity and care levels is the starting point for the 
externality model. 
 
A. Activity Levels, Care Levels, and Externalities 
 
The law and economics literature distinguishes care and activity levels.9  The care level 
refers to the level of instantaneous precaution that an actor takes when engaged in some 
activity.  For example, an actor can take more care while in the activity of driving by 
moderating his speed or looking more frequently to both sides of the road.  The activity 
level refers to the actor’s decision with respect to the frequency or location of his activity.  
                                                 
5 Coase, supra note 3. 
6 Merrill, supra note 4; Smith, supra note 4. 
7 Donald A. Wittman, First Come, First Served: An Economic Analysis of “Coming to the Nuisance”, 9 J. 
LEG. STUD. 557 (1980); Christopher M. Snyder and Rohan Pitchford, Coming to the Nuisance: An 
Economic Analysis from an Incomplete Contracts Perspective, 19 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 491 (2003). 
8 Keith N. Hylton, A Missing Markets Theory of Tort Law, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 977 (1996); Hylton, A 
Positive Theory of Strict Liability, 4 REV. LAW & ECON. 153 (2008).  Many of the arguments in this paper 
are drawn from Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Public Nuisance and the New Enforcement Actions, 18 
SUPREME COURT ECONOMIC REVIEW 43 (2010).  The notion that liability rules can be used to control 
externalities has been well understood for a long time in the law and economics literature, see, e.g., A. 
Mitchell Polinsky, Controlling Externalities and Protecting Entitlements: Property Right, Liability Rule, 
and Tax-Subsidy Approaches, 8 J. LEG. STUD. 1 (1979).  The externality (or missing markets) model uses 
this basic insight to understand the specific nuisance law rules.  
9 See Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 1 (1980). 
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If, for example, the activity of concern is driving, it can be reduced by driving less 
frequently. 
 
The invasions associated with nuisance law can be viewed as external costs associated 
with activity level choices.  Consider, for example, a manufacturer who dumps toxic 
chemicals into the water as a byproduct of its manufacturing activity.  Suppose the 
manufacturer is taking the level of care required by negligence law (reasonable care), 
and, in spite of this, the manufacturing process leads to some level of discharge of toxic 
chemicals.  In this case, the environmental harm is a negative externality associated with 
the manufacturer’s activity level choice. 
 
Whether we are considering the activity of driving a car or that of manufacturing, the 
model examined here is of activities that impose external costs on society even when they 
are carried out with reasonable care.  The question I consider is how the law can regulate 
activity levels in a way that leads to socially optimal decisions.  I will argue that nuisance 
law appears to accomplish this goal. 
 
I assume in the model below that there are two liability rules that can be applied to actors, 
strict liability and negligence.10  Under either rule, actors are assumed to take reasonable 
care.  
   
B. The Economics of Activity Level Choices 
 
For any activity, the actor engaged in it will set his privately optimal level at the point 
which maximizes his utility from that activity.  That means the actor will consider the 
benefits he derives from the activity as well as the costs, and choose a level at which the 
excess of private benefits over private costs is at its maximum.  If b(y) represents the 
private benefit enjoyed by the actor at activity level y, and c(y) represents the private cost, 
the actor will increase his activity level until 
 
b'(y) = c'(y) ,     (1) 
 
where b'(y) represents the marginal private benefit (MPB) to the actor and c'(y) represents 
the marginal private cost (MPC).  The actor’s privately optimal activity level choice is 
given by the intersection of MPB and MPC in Figure 1 (point A).11 
 
                                                 
10 The model in this paper builds on a simpler model developed in Hylton, Positive Theory, supra note 8.  
By distinguishing incentives under strict liability and under negligence, the model is sufficiently general to 
be applied to trespass law.  However, I will focus on nuisance law.  This focus can be justified by the 
assumption that the invasions (externalities) examined here are of the type generally falling under nuisance 
doctrine – such as smoke, noise, odors, etc. 
11 Figure 1 assumes that marginal benefits diminish as the actor increases his activity level, which implies 
that the marginal private benefit schedule can be represented by a downward sloping line.  Marginal private 
benefits decline because the actor gains less in utility from an additional unit of the activity as his activity 
level expands.  The marginal private cost schedule is assumed to increase as the actor increases his level of 
activity (see MPC in figure 1). 
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There are negative externalities (or external costs) associated with many activities.  
Suppose the activity is driving.  With each mile driven, the actor imposes some risk of 
harm from an accident or from pollution on the public in general.  Or, if the activity is 
manufacturing, with each widget produced, a manufacturer who discharges chemicals in 
the water imposes clean-up costs on others.  The marginal social cost of the actor’s 
activity is simply the sum of the marginal private cost and the marginal external cost 
imposed on society. Thus if v(y) represents the external cost of the activity, the marginal 
social cost (MSC) is c'(y) + v'(y). 
 
1. Cost and Benefit Externalization: Single Activity Model 
 
There may be benefits to society generated by the actor’s activity.  For example, the 
provision of water to a building, even when carried out with great care, puts the tenant’s 
property at risk of damage from escaping water, but also benefits society by enhancing 
sanitation.12  Similarly, providing internet service to a home puts the resident’s computer 
at risk through the transmission of computer viruses, but also enhances the spread of 
information across society.13  And consider driving again.  If the number of drivers 
increases from one to two, both drivers will have the added safety that if anything goes 
wrong on the road (e.g., a car falls into a pothole), they will find someone who can help 
them or call for help. 
 
The marginal social benefit is the sum of the marginal private benefit and the marginal 
external benefit of an additional unit of activity.  Thus, if z(y) represents the external 
benefit, the marginal social benefit (MSB) is b'(y) + z'(y). 
 
The final step of this economic analysis of activity level choices is to consider the 
differences between private and social incentives.  Social welfare is optimized when  
 
 b'(y) + z'(y) = c'(y) + v'(y)  .    (2) 
 
The level of activity that satisfies the social optimality condition may differ from the 
privately optimal level.  The socially and privately optimal activity levels will be the 
same if the cost and benefit externalities are equal; that is, v'(y) = z'(y).  If the external 
cost exceeds the external benefit at all activity levels, v'(y) > z'(y), then the privately 
optimal activity choice will exceed the socially optimal level; and the converse holds as 
well.14 
 
Figure 1 can be used to elaborate.  Consider the case of low and roughly equivalent 
externalities on both the cost and benefit sides, as shown in by MSC (low externality) and 
MSB (low externality).  The socially optimal level of activity, which equates the marginal 
                                                 
12 See Rickards v. Lothian [1913] A.C. 263. 
13 See Keith N. Hylton, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Immunity: An Application to Cyberspace, 87 
B.U. L. REV. 1 (2007). 
14 All externalities are real or technological externalities in this analysis.  Moreover, I assume that all 
externalities are relevant in the sense of Buchanan and Stubblebine, see James M. Buchanan and William 
C. Stubblebine, Externality, 29 ECONOMICA 371-84 (1962). 
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social benefit and the marginal social cost, is found at the point B in Figure 1.  The 
socially optimal level of activity (B) is roughly the same as the privately optimal level of 
activity (A).  The reason is that the modest positive and negative externalities cancel each 
other out. 
 
Consider the case of high externality on the cost side and low externality on the benefit 
side, as shown by the intersection of the MSC (high externality) and MSB (low 
externality), or point C in Figure 1.  Now there is a wide divergence between the 
privately optimal level of activity (A) and the socially optimal level of activity (C).  In 
this case it appears desirable for the government to intervene to reduce the level of 
activity.  Indeed, in the case of very high externality on the cost side (MSC (very high 
externality)) it may be desirable to shut down the activity completely. 
 
Finally, consider the case of low externality on the cost side and high externality on the 
benefit side, as shown at point D in Figure 1.  The privately optimal level of activity (A) 
is substantially below the socially optimal level (D).  The law should intervene to 
increase the level of activity. 
 
2. Cross Externalization of Costs and Benefits: Dual Activity Model 
 
In many settings, actors cross externalize benefits and risk.  For example, on the roads, 
drivers impose accident risks on each other even when driving with reasonable care.  In 
addition, drivers may externalize benefits.  The presence of other drivers may reduce 
some risks to certain drivers – e.g., the risk of being stranded by the side of the road may 
be lower if other drivers are present.  The same may be true in a more general sense of 
neighboring activities. The noise from one factory may at times disturb the work of a 
neighboring business.  But the factory’s presence may draw suppliers, employees, and 
customers to the area, to the benefit of other local businesses.15  Agglomeration 
externalities may make particular locations ideal for certain industries, even in the 
presence of substantial external costs.16 
 
Consider two actors S and T.  In the case of risk externalization, the activity total cost 
function for their activities can be represented as  
 
     c(yS) + c(yT) + V(yS,yT)     (3) 
 
where V(yS,yT) represents the total externalized social cost of both of their activities. 
 
For example, V(yS,yT) might represent the costs imposed on society by a cloud of 
pollution that results directly from the activities of S and T.  Alternatively, V(yS,yT) could 
represent the costs to society from specific and independent invasions from S to T and 
vice versa.  For example, S may emit noise that disturbs T, and T may emit a cloud of 
black smoke over S’s property. 
                                                 
15 Paul Krugman, Increasing Returns and Economic Geography, 99 J. POL. ECON. 483 (1991). 
16 These aspects of the economics of cities have been recognized in the nuisance case law, see Gilbert v. 
Showerman, 23 Mich. 448 (1871). 
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The total social cost of activity can be broken down as follows: 
 
           c(yS) + c(yT) + vS(yS,yT) + vT(yS,yT)   (4) 
 
where vS(yS,yT) represents the portion of the total externality cost borne by S and vT(yS,yT) 
represents the total of the externality cost borne by T.  Return to the example of pollution.  
The breakdown in (4) assumes that the total cost of pollution is borne by S and T alone, 
so the total cost can be decomposed into the portions borne by both.  The pollution 
example is complicated because it may be difficult to disentangle the specific 
contributions of S and T to the general harm.  The alternative example of independent 
cross-externalization (e.g., S emits noise, T emits smoke) is simpler, because the specific 
contributions are easily identified and separated. 
 
To simplify the discussion, assume we are dealing with a case of independent cross 
externalization – i.e., S emits noise that disturbs T, and T emits smoke that disturbs S.  In 
this case, the total social cost of the activity can be represented as  
 
     c(yS) + c(yT) + vTS(yS,yT) + vST(yS,yT)   (5) 
 
where vST represents the cost (or risk) externalized from S to T as a function of both 
activity levels and vTS represents the cost externalized from T to S.  Assuming, for 
simplicity, that no benefits are externalized, the privately optimal activity level for S will 
be determined by the condition 
 
              
S
TS
SS y
vycyb 
 )(')('   ,    (6) 
 
and a similar result holds for actor T.  It should be clear that both actors will constrain 
their activity levels more than in the single activity case considered above, because they 
will take into account the risks they personally incur when increasing activity.  If the 
benefit and cost functions are the same for both actors, and ∂vTS/∂yS = ∂vST/∂yT, they will 
choose the same activity levels.   
 
In the absence of externalized benefits, the privately optimal activity levels will be 
greater than the socially optimal levels.  This is easy to see because the socially optimal 
activity level will be determined by: 
 
          '( ) '( ) TS STS S
S S
v vb y c y
y y
       .    (7) 
 
As long as the cost externalized by S to T is responsive to changes in S’s activity level, S 
will choose an activity level that is too high from society’s perspective. 
 
If benefits are externalized, then it is no longer clear that the privately optimal activity 
levels are socially excessive.  Whether the privately optimal activity levels coincide with 
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the socially optimal levels depends on the relationship between externalized benefits and 
externalized costs.  In the case of externalized benefits, the privately optimal activity 
level will be determined by the condition 
 
           '( ) '( )TS TSS S
S S
z vb y c y
y y
       ,   (8) 
 
where zTS represents the benefit externalized from T to S (assuming an independent cross-
externalization setting).  The socially optimal level of activity is determined by the 
condition 
 
  '( ) '( )TS ST TS STS S
S S S S
z z v vb y c y
y y y y
           .   (9) 
 
It should be clear that the level of activity that satisfies the private optimality condition 
may differ from the level that satisfies the social optimality condition. 
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C. Law 
 
Since the actors are assumed to be taking reasonable care, the negligence rule cannot 
influence their activity level choices.  The negligence rule holds the actor liable only 
when he fails to take reasonable care.  Since the actors are assumed to have taken 
reasonable care, the negligence rule will not lead to any findings of liability.17 
 
Strict liability has the property that it imposes liability on actors even when they have 
taken reasonable care.  The legal system can influence activity levels through imposing 
strict liability.  In this part, I will examine the conditions under which strict liability leads 
to optimal activity levels. 
 
1. Single Activity Case 
 
Consider the case in which externality is high on the cost side and low on the benefit side.  
The socially optimal scale in this case is point C in Figure 1.  In the absence of strict 
liability, the privately optimal scale is point A.  Imposing strict liability on the actor is 
probably desirable in this case.  When strict liability is imposed on the actor, his marginal 
private cost schedule becomes equivalent to the marginal social cost schedule.  In the 
case of high externality on the cost side coupled with low externality on the benefit side, 
the actor’s privately optimal activity level under strict liability will be point E.  It is not 
the socially optimal level, which is at point C, but it is close.  Social welfare will most 
likely be improved by using liability to lead the actor to choose level E rather than the 
socially excessive level A.  I will argue below that proximate cause doctrine serves to 
adjust the activity level to the socially optimal point. 
 
Now consider the case in which externality is low both on the cost and on the benefit 
side.  The socially optimal scale of activity is associated with point B.  The privately 
optimal level of activity is associated with point A.  These are the same activity levels.  If 
strict liability is imposed on the actor, it will reduce his activity level below the socially 
optimal scale, and therefore reduce social welfare.18  Strict liability will lead him to 
choose the scale F, which is below the socially optimal scale. 
 
It follows from the foregoing that strict liability is desirable in the single activity case 
only when the external costs of the activity substantially exceed the external benefits 
associated with the activity.  In this case imposing strict liability reduces activity levels to 
                                                 
17 This assumes courts operate without error and that litigation is not costly.  If courts make mistakes and 
litigation is costly, compliance with the negligence standard does not reduce liability costs to zero.  On 
litigation costs and judicial error, see Keith N. Hylton, Costly Litigation and Legal Error under Negligence, 
6 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 433 (1990). 
18 One could say that the externality is irrelevant, in the sense of Buchanan and Stubblebine, supra note 10, 
because the net marginal effect on the third party is zero (note that the marginal negative externality is just 
balanced off by the marginal positive externality).  Alternatively, one could view this analysis as an 
exercise in “second best theory”.  Intervention to correct a market failure is sometimes ill-advised under 
second-best theory because the negative externality created by an actor may be offset by a positive 
externality (perhaps on another market).  On the theory of second best, see Richard G. Lipsey and Kelvin 
Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956).  
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a point that is closer to the socially optimal scale than would be observed under the 
negligence rule.  When the external benefits are roughly equal to or greater than the 
social costs associated with the activity, strict liability is not socially desirable. 
 
2. Dual Activity Case 
 
To simplify, assume there are no external benefits.  When negligence is the legal rule that 
applies, the privately optimal level of activity in the cross externalization model is given 
by condition (6).   
 
When strict liability is the legal rule, the privately optimal level of activity will depend on 
the type of strict liability rule adopted.  Suppose the law adopts a rule of symmetric strict 
liability, which holds both S and T strictly liable for harms.  Under the symmetric strict 
liability rule, the privately optimal activity level for actor S is determined by: 
 
              '( ) '( ) STS S
S
vb y c y
y
     .    (10) 
 
Note, comparing (6) and (10), that strict liability and negligence lead to the same activity 
levels if 
 
          ST TS
S S
v v
y y
    .      (11) 
 
In other words, as long as the harm externalized by S to T is the same as the harm 
externalized by T to S, strict liability and negligence result in the same privately optimal 
activity levels.  When the actors cross externalize reciprocal harms, strict liability and 
negligence result in the same activity levels. 
 
This generates the following Reciprocal Harm Theorem: when the costs externalized by 
two actors to each other are reciprocal, strict liability is not socially preferable to 
negligence.19  The reason is that under strict liability, you will pay for harms to others, 
while under negligence (again, everyone is complying with the negligence standard in 
this model) you will pay for only for the harms you suffer.  Since those harms are the 
same, activity levels will not differ under the two regimes. 
 
Given the condition governing socially optimal activity in (7), it should be clear that 
neither (symmetric) strict liability nor negligence will lead to socially optimal care.  Still, 
if ∂vTS/∂yS is substantially less than ∂vST/∂yS, then it follows that strict liability will 
generate an activity level for S that is closer to the socially optimal level than will the 
negligence rule.  This suggests that if S externalizes much more cost to T than T 
externalizes to S, strict liability will be socially preferable to negligence. 
 
                                                 
19 On the “reciprocal harm” proposition, see Hylton, Missing Markets, 1996; Hylton, Positive Theory, 
2008; supra note 6. 
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Now consider asymmetric strict liability.  Suppose S is subject to strict liability and T is 
subject to the negligence rule.  Under asymmetric strict liability, the following conditions 
govern the activity levels chosen by S and T. 
 
      
'( ) '( )
'( ) '( )
TS ST
S S
S S
T T
v vb y c y
y y
b y c y
    

    (12) 
 
These conditions imply that S will exercise the socially optimal level of activity, because 
he will pay for the harms he externalizes to T and he will also have to pay for the harms 
externalized by T.  T will not exercise the socially optimal level of activity.  If, however, 
S’s external costs are substantial and T’s are trivial, this is a better solution than the one 
provided by the negligence rule. 
 
 
III. Theory of Nuisance Law 
 
I have presented an economic analysis of activity level choices and considered its 
implications for law.  In this part I examine the law to see if it conforms to the predictions 
of the model. 
 
Some parts of the doctrine are easily interpreted in light of similar tort rules.  Consider 
the legal definition of a nuisance: an intentional, nontrespassory and unreasonable 
invasion into the quiet use and enjoyment of property.  Intentional, in nuisance law, has 
always had a meaning similar to its meaning in the context of trespass law: it is enough if 
the defendant was aware of the nuisance, and the plaintiff is not required to prove that the 
defendant aimed to harm him.  The term nontrespassory has always had the effect of 
distinguishing between invasions that interfere with exclusive possession of property or a 
portion of it (e.g., an invading boulder) and invasions that merely make it less desirable to 
remain in possession of property (e.g., smoke).  I will go beyond these comparisons with 
trespass doctrine to examine how this paper’s model justifies the definition and doctrines 
of nuisance. 
 
A. Nontrespassory Invasions 
 
The definition of a nuisance as a nontrespassory invasion distinguishes nuisances from 
trespasses and also from consensual transactions.  If the interference is the result of the 
consent of the victim, then it is not properly characterized as an invasion. 
 
The invasiveness requirement is implicated by the externality model.  If the interference 
is consensual, in the sense that the affected party is fully aware of the nature of the 
interference and still contracts with the offending actor, then there is no need for the law 
to intervene to control the activity level of the offending actor.  The activity level will be 
regulated to the optimal level by the market.  Thus, if a person contracts with another to 
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install a noisy furnace, and he is fully aware of the noise that will be emitted by the 
furnace when he enters the contract, he has no basis to bring a nuisance claim against the 
furnace supplier for the noise interference. 
 
This argument can be put in terms of the single-activity model.  Suppose buyers are 
contracting with a seller whose product generates a negative externality – for example, 
the seller markets widgets that explode, but no one knows about the risk.  Assume there is 
no positive externality associated with the product.  Obviously, the buyers were not 
aware of the negative externality – otherwise it would not be an externality.  The market 
equilibrium would occur at the output scale where the marginal private benefit of 
consumption equaled the marginal private cost of supply: b'(y) = c'(y).   But this would 
result in socially excessive consumption, because the socially optimal output scale occurs 
where b'(y) = c'(y) + v'(y).  If the buyers are aware of the negative feature of the product, 
then the effective market demand schedule would be b'(y) – v'(y).  The market 
equilibrium would occur where b'(y) – v'(y) = c'(y), which is socially optimal.20 
 
B. Intentional Invasions 
 
The externality model provides a theory of intent in nuisance law.  The purpose of strict 
liability is to regulate activity levels.  In order to carry out this function, liability must be 
applied to actors that have sufficient information to have their activity level choices 
influenced by liability.  For example, an actor that decides to locate a smoke-belching 
factory next to a residential area must be aware of the invasions caused by the smoke 
from his factory if strict liability is going to have any impact on his initial location 
decision.21  In the cross externalization model examined earlier, strict liability led to 
optimal incentives on the part of the nuisance generator because the marginal cost of his 
activity became c'(yS) + ∂vTS/∂yS + ∂vST/∂yS.  But if the nuisance generator does not have 
enough information to be aware of his imposition on others (∂vST/∂yS), the threat of strict 
liability cannot regulate his activity level choices. 
 
Suppose, for example, the nuisance generator’s activity causes toxic chemicals to leach 
into the soil and contaminate a tributary to the groundwater supply used by the victim.  If 
the nuisance generator is unaware that chemicals are leaching into the soil, or (more 
likely) of the existence of the tributary, then the intentionality requirement would not be 
satisfied.22 
                                                 
20 Invasiveness, viewed from an economic perspective, means that the negative externality was not the 
result of a consensual, fully informed transaction.  Otherwise, the market would generate optimal 
consumption (activity) levels.  It should be clear that there is no bright line economic definition of the 
invasiveness concept.   
21 It is quite likely that strict liability will have ex post effects on an actor’s scale or location decision.  After 
moving to a location, the burden of strict liability probably would induce a nuisance generator to scale back 
its activity and perhaps to move it to another location, even if the generator was not aware of the costs 
imposed on victims.  However, strict liability cannot affect ex ante incentives if the generator is unaware of 
the costs externalized to victims. 
22 There is an underlying question of what it means to be “unaware” of the harm imposed on the victim.  To 
some extent, this is a problem running through all of intentional torts.  At some point, awareness of danger 
reaches the level where an actor’s conduct has to be described as intentional.  The courts have never set 
attempted to set out probability thresholds that would determine an awareness of harm that would requires 
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It follows that intention in nuisance law, at its core, does not mean intending to harm the 
victim, or intending to interfere with the victim’s use of his property.  It is sufficient that 
the actor has enough information to either be aware of or to easily foresee the harmful 
impact of his activity on others. 
 
C. Unreasonable Invasions 
 
The most important term in the definition of nuisance is “unreasonable”.  The theory of 
this paper suggests a clear interpretation for the reasonableness test of nuisance law.  The 
model presented in the previous part suggests that an unreasonable invasion is one that is 
associated with an activity for which: (a) the external costs substantially exceed the 
external benefits, or (b) the external costs thrown off by the defendant’s activity are not 
reciprocal to the external costs thrown off by other local activities.23  These two 
conditions describe the settings in which the law should intervene to reduce an actor’s 
activity level.  Provided that the intentionality and nontrespassory descriptions apply to a 
particular invasion, the law should impose strict liability when the external costs exceed 
external benefits or are non-reciprocal. 
 
Nuisance doctrine is closely related to the law and theory of strict liability articulated in 
Rylands v. Fletcher.24  The Rylands court described several nuisance cases as falling 
within the rationale of its decision.  This is useful because the law on Rylands-based strict 
liability has been set out with much greater clarity than nuisance law. 
 
Using the theory of Rylands as the closest doctrinal source for nuisance law, we can set 
out the following test for a nuisance: 
 
(a) existence of a high degree of interference with the quiet use and enjoyment of 
land of others; 
(b) inability to eliminate the interference by the exercise of reasonable care; 
(c) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage; 
(d) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on and; 
(e) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its obnoxious 
            attributes. 
 
I will refer to this below as the nuisance test. These factors are based on the Second 
Restatement’s articulation of the Rylands doctrine in the form of a set of rules, in Section 
                                                                                                                                                 
the label intentional.  For an early and rather complete examination of intent and probability in the law, see 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 52-59 (1881). 
23 Many of the activities subjected to strict liability can be viewed as aggregations of risk rather than as 
different in kind from ordinary risks.  For example, the risk created by storing explosives is simply an 
aggregation of the risk anyone creates by storing something that can explode.  The unusual risk creation 
that justifies strict liability can therefore be viewed as an aggregation or consolidation of risks which are 
ordinarily confronted in a dispersed and uncorrelated form. 
24 L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).  The Rylands case treats ultrahazardous and nuisance cases as all part of the 
same general doctrine.  On the connection between Rylands and nuisance doctrine, see also Hylton, 
Positive Theory of Strict Liability, supra note 6.  
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520.  The foregoing five-factor test is an attempt to examine whether the external costs 
thrown off by a nuisance substantially exceed external benefits, or are reciprocated by 
background external costs of other activities.25 
 
The first two factors of this test require that the interference be substantial even when the 
actor is taking reasonable care.   As in the case of abnormally dangerous activities, the 
first two factors should be treated as minimal requirements for nuisance liability.  If, in 
other words, the interference would be trivial if the actor took reasonable care, then the 
interference should not be considered a nuisance, and there is no need to examine the 
remaining factors of the test.26 
 
The remaining three components present the core of the reasonableness test in nuisance 
law.  The third factor, common usage, helps identify activities for which the risks are 
reciprocal to those of other common activities.  If an activity is one of common usage, 
then actors engaged in the activity will impose reciprocal risks on each other, and there is 
no basis for adopting strict liability over negligence.27 
 
The fourth factor, inappropriateness, is both another way of determining whether the 
activity imposes a reciprocated risk and a way of assessing whether the risks are balanced 
off by the external benefits.  Since the fourth factor focuses on the location, it should be 
treated as a type of assumption of risk test.  An activity would be considered appropriate 
or reasonable for its location if its costs are typical of other activities in the locale, or if its 
externalized benefits would make it reasonable for someone in the area to tolerate the 
costs (because the externalized benefits exceed the externalized costs). 
 
The last factor asks the court to directly compare the benefits externalized by the activity 
and the costs externalized.  When the benefits are substantial, the last factor suggests that 
the court should be reluctant to impose liability on a nuisance theory.  Consider, for 
example, the noise generated by a fire station.  Suppose it is a particularly busy fire 
station.  The noise generated by fire trucks constantly moving in and out of the station 
with their alarms running could be deemed to substantially interfere with the quiet use 
and enjoyment of land by neighbors.  However, the neighbors also benefit by being 
                                                 
25 The Second Restatement has another provision, Section 826, that sets out a test specifically for nuisance 
law (discussed supra, note 1).  However, Section 826 fails to appropriately distinguish nuisance and 
negligence doctrine, and to give a proper sense of the balancing test implicit in nuisance doctrine.  In 
contrast, Section 520 of Restatement (Second) provides a fairly accurate description of the Rylands 
common law, which is equivalent at its core to the nuisance common law. 
26 Judge Posner’s decision in Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. v. American Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 
1990), an ultrahazardous activity strict liability case, is consistent with this proposition. 
27 One strand of the property-rights (or trespass law) perspective (discussed supra, note 4) has suggested 
that the reciprocal harms concept can be understood as a softening of property rights in settings in which 
transaction costs could justify it.  See Richard Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian 
Constraints, 8 J. Legal. Stud. 49 (1979).  The corrective justice theory is quite different from the economic 
model examined here.  Corrective justice theories sometimes reach conclusions that are consistent with 
economic models, as in this case, but they tend to be based on a style of argument that eschews formal 
analysis.  Moreover, within an economic framework, one of the important questions examined in any 
attempt to provide a positive theory of the law is whether the legal rule at issue is likely to lead to a socially 
optimal equilibrium.  That question is unaddressed in the corrective justice context. 
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located close to the fire station.  Since those benefits are substantial and widely dispersed, 
the neighbors should not be allowed to impose strict liability on a nuisance theory against 
the fire station.  There is no economic basis for using liability as an incentive to force the 
fire station to cut back on its activity or to reconsider its location decision.28 
 
In Baines v. Baker,29 the defendants proposed to erect a hospital for treating smallpox 
patients in Coldbath Fields, London.  The plaintiff, an owner of rental property in the 
area, sued to enjoin the building as a nuisance.  The court refused to enjoin on the ground 
that the plaintiff’s property-value losses due to fears, even though rational, were not 
recoverable through a nuisance action; and that the public benefits of the hospital would 
justify the external costs. 
 
The most famous nuisance case involving the balancing of external costs and benefits is 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson.30  The defendants operated a coal mine, and in the 
process of operation brought up underground water.  The water brought up by the mining 
operation flowed into and polluted a surface stream that was used three miles away by the 
plaintiff as a source of water for the home.  The court described the case as pitting the 
interests of the leading industry of the state against riparian property owners.  It also 
characterized the case as a purely private nuisance, not affecting general access to usable 
water, because the community had “abundant pure water from other sources.”31  The 
court held that the plaintiff’s activity had to yield because of the importance of the 
defendant’s activity to the local economy.32 
 
The externality balancing test implies a movement toward expanding strict liability as an 
economy becomes wealthier.  For a subsistence level economy, the introduction of 
industry should have enormous beneficial externalities.  But as the wealth and industry 
expand, the positive externalities of industrial expansion probably diminish.33  And 
wealthier consumers will attach a greater valuation to recreational and aesthetic interests. 
  
D. Scope of Liability: Proximate Cause, Extra-Sensitive Plaintiffs, and Coming to the 
Nuisance 
 
Under the proximate cause rule courts have limited the scope of nuisance liability to 
injuries that are connected in a predictable way to the externalized risk.  Injuries that are 
                                                 
28 See Malhame v. Borough of Demarest, 162 N.J. 248, 392 A. 2d 652 (Law Div. 1978). 
29 (1752) Ambler 158; for a summary, see Nathaniel Cleveland Moak & John Thomas Cook, Reports of 
Cases Decided by English Courts: with Notes and References, 1884, at 368-69, text available online at: 
http://books.google.com/books?id=i3UyAAAAIAAJ.  
30 113 Pa. 126; 6 Atl. 453 (1886).  For an insightful discussion of Sanderson, see Todd J. Zywicki, A 
Unanimity-Reinforcing Model of Efficiency in the Common Law: An Institutional Comparison of Common 
Law and Legislative Solutions to the Large-Number Externality Problems, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 961, 
1017-1020 (1996). 
31 Id., at 459 
32 Id. 
33 In particular, the positive externalities created by the enhancement of market infrastructure and other 
social benefits from industrialization diminish.  However, even in a wealthy industrialized economy, there 
may be commercial activities that throw off external benefits.  For example, information technology, by 
enhancing the dissemination of information through society, carries significant positive externalities. 
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not predictably related to the externalized risk are not within the scope of strict nuisance 
liability.  The externality model suggests a reason for this: to focus liability on the cost 
externalizing features of the defendant’s activity rather than the activity per se.  Suppose 
the victim drives his car into the defendant’s malarial pond.  To permit a strict liability 
action would fail to tax the defendant’s activity for the specific risk creation – i.e., the 
risk of malaria – that nuisance law aims to discourage. 
 
A clearer justification for the proximate cause rule in nuisance law can be based on the 
model of the previous section.  Return to the single-activity model and let the 
externalized risk component, v(y), be separated into two subcomponents,  
 
v(y) = v1(y) + v2(y),       (13)  
 
where v1(y) is the normal risk externalized by activities of the defendant’s type and v2(y) 
is the extraordinary risk that makes the defendant’s activity a nuisance.  For example, in 
the case of a malarial pond, v1(y) is the risk externalized by any water storage, and v2(y) is 
the malaria risk.  The proximate cause rule excludes liability for the normal risk 
component.  If, as nuisance law implicitly assumes, normal risks are balanced off by 
(normal) positive externalities, then excluding liability for normal risk leads to optimal 
activity levels. 
 
To see this, note that the social optimum would require the level of care to be set so that 
b'(y) + z'(y) = c'(y) + v'1(y) + v'2(y).  If most normal negative externalities (background 
risks) are cancelled out by normal positive externalities, z'(y) = v'1(y).  Thus, the social 
optimum is achieved where b'(y) = c'(y) + v'2(y).  The proximate cause rule leads to the 
social optimum in activity by excluding the normal risk component, v1(y), as a source of 
liability.  In terms of Figure 1, suppose v'1(y) represents the “low externality” cost 
increment (MSC (low externality)), and suppose v'2(y) represents the “high externality” 
cost increment (MSC (high externality)).  If normal positive externalities are present (i.e., 
MSB (low externality) measures the marginal social benefit of the activity), the socially 
optimal activity level is that associated with point C.  However, strict liability applied 
without any offset based on the proximate cause rule would lead the actor to choose the 
activity level associated with point E.  Applying the proximate cause rule of nuisance 
law, which limits application of strict liability to those injuries attributable to the 
extraordinary risk, leads the actor to choose the socially optimal activity level (point C). 
 
The extra-sensitive plaintiff problem is closely related to the proximate cause issue.  
Nuisance law does not provide for compensation to the extra-sensitive plaintiff, such as 
one who complains of illnesses caused by such ordinary activity as the ringing of church 
bells.34  The justification for this settled piece of the law is best understood in terms of the 
theory offered here.  A nuisance exists when the externalized costs associated with an 
activity are substantially in excess of externalized benefits, or the externalized costs are 
not reciprocated by the external costs of other background activities.  The comparison of 
externalized costs and benefits is made with respect to statistical averages, not to any 
particular plaintiff.  If, on the basis of statistical averages, the externalized costs 
                                                 
34 Rogers v. Elliott, 15 N.E. 768 (Mass. 1888). 
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associated with an activity are not substantially greater than the externalized benefits (or 
background external costs), then the activity is not a nuisance, under this framework, 
even though an individual within the community might suffer an injury from it. 
 
In terms of the model, the extra-sensitive plaintiff rule, as well as other rules, can be 
understood by introducing random components to the external cost.  In the single-activity 
model, let 
 
    v(y) = v1(y) + 1(y) + v2(y) + 2(y)    (14) 
 
where the error terms represent random shocks that might alter the externality level in 
specific instances beyond the average level.  The law, however, has to be determined by 
and for average cases.  Thus, the optimal activity condition is b'(y) + z'(y) = c'(y) + v'1(y) 
+ v'2(y), and since on average z'(y) = v'1(y), the optimal activity condition simplifies to 
b'(y) = c'(y) + v'2(y). 
 
This analysis implies that if the average risk associated with the activity is only the 
background level v1(y), the activity is not a nuisance even if the associated random shock 
component (1(y)) is substantial in a specific instance.  The activity of ringing church 
bells emits a normal background risk.  In a specific instance, it may lead to an unusual 
harm, such as causing a church neighbor to suffer a rare neurosis.  The harm observed in 
that specific instance does not alter the finding that the activity itself does not constitute a 
nuisance. 
 
In the same sense v2(y) can be taken to represent the expected risk associated with the 
extraordinary externalization component.  Because social optimality requires b'(y) = c'(y) 
+ v'2(y), strict liability is imposed for this component of the external cost.  The error term 
2 can be taken to represent remote risks.  For example, suppose the actor emits an 
unusual amount of black smoke, sufficient to create a public nuisance for passersby on 
the roads.  Suppose the smoke does not interfere with a passerby, but the passerby stops 
to look at the smoke.  After the passerby returns to the road he gets into an accident.  The 
smoke emission would be a “but-for cause” of the accident, but it would be considered a 
remote injury in relation to the extraordinary externalization component.  By excluding 
liability for remotely related injuries, nuisance law maintains incentives for socially 
optimal activity levels. 
 
A better sense of the motivation for the proximate cause test in the case in which the 
specific extraordinary risk has been realized can be suggested by writing the risk 
decomposition as  
 
   v(y) = v1(y) + v2(y)(1 +  v1|2(y) + … + vN|2(y))        (15)  
 
where each component v1|2(y) through vN|2(y) represents a conditional risk based on the 
realization of the extraordinary risk v2(y).  When the extraordinary risk is realized – e.g., 
a continuing release of black smoke or loud noise – many other events may change as a 
result, generating injuries.  Those other events can be viewed as conditional risks; again, 
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consider the example of the passerby who delays his travel as he looks at the black smoke 
and then gets hit by a bolt of lightning two minutes later.  The release of the extraordinary 
risk reshuffles the deck, in a sense, and changes the path of later events.  But if the 
nuisance generator is held liable because the release of the extraordinary risk has 
“reshuffled the deck”, then he will be potentially liable for an infinite number of injuries.  
If courts held defendants liable for the conditional risks, the liability would be virtually 
limitless.  The proximate cause test reduces the risk of limitless liability and generally 
avoids excessive liability. 
 
E. Coming to the Nuisance 
 
Sometimes defendants argue that plaintiffs should not be able to recover because they 
“came to the nuisance”.  The coming to the nuisance defense is valid in some cases, but 
not in all.  The theory of this paper provides a justification for the ambiguous treatment of 
the coming-to-the-nuisance defense.   
 
Since the goal of nuisance liability is to optimally regulate activity levels, a victim’s 
decision to come to the nuisance is certainly a relevant piece of information.  The 
victim’s decision to move is no different from the case of the buyer who contracts with a 
seller to purchase some item with a latent and dangerous defect.  If the buyers are aware 
of the negative feature of the product, then the effective market demand schedule would 
be described by b'(y) – v'(y).  The market equilibrium would occur where b'(y) – v'(y) = 
c'(y), which is socially optimal.  Thus, if a smoke-belching factory sits alone in an area, 
and the victim moves next door to it, there would be no reason to view the factory’s 
activity as socially excessive.  In this case, the coming-to-the-nuisance defense applies. 
 
There are two reasons that the coming-to-the-nuisance defense might not be desirable in 
this model.  First, the victim may not have been aware of the offender’s activity when 
purchasing his property.  In Ensign v. Walls,35 the defendant maintained dog-breeding 
business in residential area of Detroit.  The invasions (odors, noise, occasional escapes, 
filth) caused by the defendant’s activity may not have been obvious to prospective 
residents; most probably became aware of the nuisance after moving in.  Using the 
single-activity model for the purposes of analogy, in this sort of case the market 
equilibrium would occur where b'(y) = c'(y) (because the invasive feature of the 
defendant’s activity was not apparent to the new resident), while the social optimum 
would occur where b'(y) – v'(y) = c'(y). 
 
The second reason the coming-to-the-nuisance defense may not be desirable is that the 
market for real property can be distinguished from most other markets for goods or 
services.  Suppose the community consists of one smoke-belching factory and 99 
residents.  It is clear in this case that the reciprocal harm condition would not be satisfied 
(∂vTS/∂yS  ∂vST/∂yS); the background risks externalized by the residents would be trivial 
in comparison to the cost externalized by the factory.  If the coming-to-the-nuisance 
defense were allowed, there would be no mechanism to control the activity level of the 
factory.  The factory could double its level of activity without meeting any liability.  This 
                                                 
35 34 N.W.2d 549 (Mich. 1948). 
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is distinguishable from the ordinary market setting in which the market transaction 
involves a fixed level of risk (e.g., a widget that explodes with probability .01), and in 
which the turnover of buyers continually constrains the consumption of risky products.36 
 
As a general matter, strict nuisance liability hinges on a comparison of externalized costs 
to externalized benefits or to reciprocal background risks.  The historical pattern should 
not be controlling. 
 
The justifications for the law on priority offered within this model do not diminish the 
more traditional transaction-cost based understanding.  A rule favoring priority would 
encourage socially wasteful races and expropriation.37  My argument suggests that one 
can account for the law on priority without resorting to the transaction cost theory. 
 
F. Shut Downs 
 
Notice that in Figure 1 if external costs are very high and external benefits are 
nonexistent, the optimal scale of the offending activity is zero.  Another way of 
expressing the same point is in terms of total benefit and total costs.  A shut down of 
activity should occur when b(y) + z(y) < c(y) + v(y); or equivalently when b(y) – c(y) < 
v(y) – z(y).  In other words, a shut down should occur when the net external cost exceeds 
the joint surplus from the activity.38 
 
The theoretical recommendation that a cost-benefit test should apply to the issuance of 
injunctions is consistent with nuisance law.  In Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.,39 the New 
York court reversed a preexisting state doctrine that favored the granting of injunctions 
for any substantial unreasonable invasions.  The court held that in the presence of a great 
disparity between the economic value of the nuisance generator’s activity and the harm 
imposed on the victims, courts should issue damage awards rather than injunctions.  The 
reason underlying the decision was consistent with long-standing principles of equity, 
which most courts follow on the matter of injunctions.  Under those principles, an 
                                                 
36 The key problem is the ability of the factory to increase the invasion without facing any additional cost.  
In the case of the widget seller, the risk of explosion is fixed with every widget.  Moreover, if the widget 
seller causes the risk of explosion to increase, that will affect the widget market – assuming buyers know 
the risk.  The market constrains the widget seller, to some extent, from increasing the risk.  In the nuisance 
context, suppose a new resident purchases property knowing the risk of an invasion, so the cost of the 
invasion is capitalized into the property price.  But for any given expectation of risk, the nuisance-
generating factory can always make it worse later.  If the nuisance-generator could assert priority as a 
defense, the cost of making it worse for residents would be zero on the margin. 
37 Wittman, supra note 7; Snyder and Pitchford, supra note 7; Epstein, supra note 21; Smith, supra note 4. 
38 The shut down point is reached where the net social benefit from the activity is obviously negative.  
Although Calabresi and Melamed did not examine nuisance doctrine, the general notion that injunctions 
could be appropriately applied to activities for which the social costs clearly outweighed the social gains 
was explored, largely in the margins, of their famous article on property rules, see Calabresi and Melamed, 
supra note 4.  For a more extensive model, see Keith N. Hylton, Property Rules and Liability Rules, Once 
Again, 2 REV. LAW & ECONOMICS 137 (2006).  This is also consistent with Cooter’s prices and sanctions 
model, see Robert D. Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523 (1984). 
39 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E. 2d 871, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970). 
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injunction would be appropriate only when the benefits of an injunction appeared to be 
greater than the costs. 
 
If damage payments accurately reflected all of the losses suffered by victims, there would 
never be a need to issue an injunction.  Every case involving extremely high external 
costs would be shut down, in effect, by damage awards.40  Given this, why are 
injunctions are ever issued? 
 
The economic case for injunctions is that damage awards do not compensate for all of the 
losses suffered by victims of nuisances.  The more specific reasons differ in the private 
and public nuisance settings.  In the private nuisance setting, a sufficiently offensive 
invasion will impose large subjective losses on victims.  For example, suppose the 
offending activity sends so much black smoke over the plaintiff’s property that it is 
impossible to live on the property.  Then the defendant has effectively seized the property 
of the plaintiff.  A damage award in this case would compensate the plaintiff for the 
market value of the property, but not for the subjective loss from expropriation.  The 
injunction is preferable because it forces offending activities to either pay for the full 
losses (objective and subjective) or shut down.  In the public nuisance setting, the damage 
awards will also fail to compensate plaintiffs for all of their losses.  The rule governing 
damages does not provide compensation for ordinary inconveniences.  However, even if 
victims could be compensated for ordinary inconveniences, most would not sue because 
the cost of suit would be to be too high relative to the likely damage awards.  Given this, 
the injunction is socially preferable. 
 
The injunctions can be viewed in both cases as minimizing error costs.  Damage awards 
could in theory lead to optimal shut down decisions, but the types of error built in to the 
strict liability system are obvious.  Subjective losses are not compensated in the private 
nuisance cases and the standard inconveniences are not compensated through public 
nuisance lawsuits.  Because of these gaps, nuisances that should be shut down may easily 
escape that outcome in a system in which courts applied only liability rules to nuisance 
activities. 
 
VI. Remaining Notes on the Transaction Cost Model and Boundary Issues 
 
A complete economic model of nuisance law would consist of the transaction cost model 
and the externality model, with the transaction cost model used to explain the boundaries 
of nuisance law and the externality model used to explain its regulatory function.  The 
foregoing analysis deemphasizes the boundary question that has been the focus of 
transaction cost analysis.  The strategic decision to deemphasize the boundary question 
does not at all imply that it, and the transaction cost model, are in any sense less 
important. 
 
I have already noted some of the boundary questions examined under the transaction cost 
model; specifically the choice between trespass and nuisance, and the rule on priority.  
                                                 
40 See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and 
Damage Remedies, 32 STAN, L. REV. 1075 (1980). 
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The transaction cost model appears to be superior to the externality model as a theory of 
the boundary between nuisance and trespass law.  However, both the transaction cost and 
externality models provide justifications for the law’s treatment of priority. 
 
One other boundary question, unexamined so far, is the exclusion of protection under 
nuisance law for aesthetic interests, such as the right to sunlight or to a view of the 
mountains.41  The exclusion of aesthetic interests appears to be better explained by the 
transaction cost model than by the externality model.  It is obviously an externality, in the 
technical sense, when a landowner erects a fence that blocks the sunlight to another 
adjacent landowner.  There is no reason suggested by the externality model for not 
treating the harm to the adjacent landowner as potentially a nuisance. 
 
Under the transaction cost model, there is a clearer economic case for excluding liability 
for aesthetic harms (such as blocked sunlight).  If aesthetic interests were protected by 
nuisance law, there would immediately be questions of information and proof.  If one 
adjacent landowner can sue the owner of a hotel for blocking sunlight, why not allow 
other adjacent landowners?  The transaction costs of resolving these disputes in the 
bargaining process would be enormous.  On the other hand, if the law refuses to protect 
aesthetic interests, then the transaction costs of resolving disputes would be much more 
manageable. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
Nuisance doctrine is complicated and covers a wide array of cases, but at its core it is 
simple and straightforward.  The long-standing complaints about its incoherence are 
invalid.  The law generates optimal activity levels by imposing strict liability when 
externalized risks are far in excess of externalized benefits or far in excess of background 
risks.  Existing nuisance doctrine is consistent with this theory. 
 
 
 
                                                 
41 See, e.g., Fountainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357 (Fla. App. 1959). 
